"NATO allies squabble over many things, but on one they all agree: if Afghanistan is ever to be secure, prosperous, and cohesive, it must first be paved." Philip Smucker, writing for The Atlantic Monthly, explores whether better highways can save Afghanistan. I would not gravitate by instinct to the subject of roadbuilding for an intriguing and adventure-filled story on the future of Afghanistan. But here we are:

Road building is by far Afghanistan's largest public-works program today, and as such it is to some extent an end in itself. One U.S. military engineer, Army Commander Larry LeGree, boasts that--with his extensive budget--he can outspend the Taliban and al-Qaeda at every bend in the road. If, for example, al-Qaeda-backed insurgents are getting $5 a day, he'll pay a road worker $5.50. He says he is banking on the belief that many insurgents will--for the right price--opt out of the fight in favor of roadwork.

The completion of the Ring Road (scheduled for 2010), along with key bridges and border-crossing points, is expected to raise the nation's official trade from $4.7 billion in 2005 to some $12 billion in 2016. Already, the 300-mile ride south from Kabul to Kandahar on this route, which used to take 14 hours, can be completed in five, or fewer if you are in a hurry, which is invariably the case. Fresh asphalt hasn't kept the Taliban and assorted brigands from setting up mobile "gantlets" along the highway, where they sometimes extort, rob, kidnap, or behead passersby. Still, these security threats seem to be only a limited deterrent for Afghan truck drivers, who are renowned across South Asia for their stamina and courage.

Will better roads really make a big difference to Afghanistan's future? The Taliban certainly seem to think so: the group's forces have made a concerted effort to stop construction. Insurgents regularly target road crews in their camps and as they work. Indeed, LeGree's wage math leaves out an important variable: al-Qaeda not only pays insurgents a day rate, but also--according to U.S. platoon leaders--offers incentives for killing U.S. soldiers and Afghan road workers, dozens of whom have been slaughtered in eastern Afghanistan alone. The need for fortified camps and armed guards makes the cost of road construction in Afghanistan 30 to 50 percent higher than elsewhere in South Asia.

Don't let anyone tell you that economic development has nothing to do with the power base, or lack thereof, enjoyed by militant extremists. It's remarkable how much significance a project like Afghanistan's ring road takes on in the present context. The war on terror, or whatever we're calling it these days, is inextricable from this sort of civilian-led work.