The GII is motivated by the idea that U.S. foreign policy is improved when the public understands and participates in the decision-making process, to some degree at least. We tend to focus on how the public could and should influence global health, development, the environment, even nuclear disarmament. But I'm not sure I've ever argued (or spent much time considering the possiblity) that the public should delve into intelligence issues. This would seem to be the issue most closed off to influence from the public. Yet in Sunday's Washington Post, Mark Lowenthal, former assistant director of central intelligence and vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, called for the intelligence community, first and foremost, to explain itself to the public.

The U.S. intelligence community has failed. We have failed as a public institution and as a profession. We have failed not because of 9/11, or Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, or Iran's supposed WMD, or the horror stories about renditions and detentions. We have failed because we have not explained ourselves adequately and comprehensibly to the public.

Lowenthal is disturbed by the sorts of promises that political leaders make about "fixing" our intelligence structure to create an airtight system that will guarantee no more 9/11s -- or Iraqs:

The intelligence community's predicament was largely forged by two very different events: the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the failure to find WMD in Iraq. But the lessons that outsiders have learned from these two watersheds have often been glib, fatuous and contradictory.

In 9/11, intelligence was excoriated for "failing to connect the dots" -- a demeaning, inapt concept that, unfortunately, has entered the popular lexicon. But in Iraq, intelligence was blamed for connecting too many dots.

In 9/11, intelligence did not warn intensely enough. But in Iraq, intelligence warned too intensely.

In 9/11, intelligence was faulted for a "failure of imagination." But in Iraq, intelligence had too vivid an imagination.

In 9/11, the failure to share intelligence was seen as a major problem. But in Iraq, too much information -- such as the fabricated reports about mobile bioweapons labs from the Iraqi defector infamously code-named "Curveball" -- was shared.

The subtext here, as we say in intelligence analysis, is that intelligence needs to be right all the time. But it can't be, no matter how blithely the critics expect otherwise. And it's past time we all got used to that...

It is too disturbing to hear the truth: Despite what we have learned, despite the changes that we have made, it could indeed happen again. And it is both comical and distressing to see members of Congress declare that, with the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004, the United States was once again made safe.

If I understand Lowenthal's reasoning, he is essentially arguing for a more humble approach to the products intelligence agencies put out. Don't expect too much out of us, he's saying; we can give you useful information, but it's up to you (policymakers) to make the tough calls since intel agencies aren't supposed to be doing this anyway. The agencies do a better job of keeping policymakers generally well-informed with a menu of likely scenarios and options.

Lowenthal is right. The real world is quite unlike an episode of 24; we should not expect to catch terrorists in the act, nor should we promise such things to Americans. But it's easy for intel pros like Lowenthal to argue along these lines when their agencies are taking a beating. I suspect the national intelligence agencies got to be the political force they are today because, not content to gather data and dispense it, they themselves promised more.