The HELP Commission, given the unenviable task of figuring out how to reform U.S. foreign assistance programs, has been at work for almost two years. Just this week, the commission released its report at last. I had the chance to hear a number of the commissioners discuss their conclusions at Brookings on Monday. The commission's recommendations are ambitious, and there was much back-and-forth about which were achievable.

But, as is our wont at CPSS, I couldn't help look at this from an evaluator's perspective. What did the HELP legislation create the commission to accomplish? Did it meet those goals? Let's go back to the tapes:

The HELP Commission shall develop and deliver actionable proposals to the President, Secretary of State and Congress to enhance and leverage the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance programs to reduce poverty through sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency. The Commission will communicate the need for change and will make bold recommendations for mechanisms, structures and incentives which will create definable, achievable and measurable outcomes that empower recipients and meet U.S. national security and foreign policy goals and objectives.

I was afraid that such a long process, amidst so much structural turmoil between the State Department and USAID, would result in few useful, actionable recommendations. Not so. Take a look at the table of contents in the report. Take a moment and think: what are your main concerns with the way U.S. foreign assistance is formulated and delivered? Fragmented agencies and approaches? Incoherent trade v. aid policies? DoD encroachment? A dreadfully outdated Foreign Assistance Act? The Congressional budgetary process? Earmarks? Presidential special initiatives? Procurement and tied aid? Too few channels for initiative and local entrepreneurship? No graduation strategy? Anemic staff and curtailed authority at USAID? Short-term political objectives at State? Preventive v. palliative programs? It's all there. The answers are not perfect and some may have only a slim chance of fruition, but this is a remarkably thorough and bold treatment of what is wrong with U.S. foreign aid.

The headline-grabbing recommendations will center, no doubt, on the structural aspects of the report. Commissioners lay out three possibilities: the status quo "F" process; restructuring State, USAID and other agencies into a "super State Department" called the International Affairs Department; or creating a cabinet level position for a director of foreign assistance. Commissioners differed on this issue (and others) to the degree that three of them created a dissenting addendum(pdf) to the HELP Commission report. Commissioner Jeffrey Sachs did not sign the report at all.

Obviously, the HELP report will be of most use to the next administration, since the current one has made its flawed play at this. As former Congressman and longtime champion of aid reform Jim Kolbe commented Monday, it's not clear how soon any future president can spend much time on this when Iraq, Afghanistan, health care and entitlement programs will demand immediate attention. It will require a president who is committed to the issue of global development and willing to expend political capital to see our process improved. This was always the case. But I feel much better that he or she will have the HELP report on hand when the time comes.